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Leading and Confirming Indicators of
General Business Changes
Geoffrey H. Moore
THIs is a progress report on a series of experithents being conducted at
the National Bureau of Economic Research that we hope will enable us
to learn more about the way our economy behaves. These experiments
have had a fairly long history, and I should like to review it briefly.
Selection and Class/Ication of Indicators
Before the war, in 1937, Wesley Mitchell and Arthur Burns picked
a set of twenty-one indicators from among the several hundred time
series that the National Bureau had analyzed in its study of business
cycles.' After the war I undertook to redo the job and in 1950 published
a new list of twenty-one indicators.2 They are classified in three groups—
leading, roughly coincident, and lagging—according to their tendency
to reach cyclical turns ahead of, at about the same time as, or later than
business cycle peaks and troughs.3 Many of the series in my list were
either identical with or closely related to those in Mitchell's and Burns' list,
but I omitted some that seemed redundant or of dubious value, and added
some on the basis of new information. But both their study and mine
were based on prewar information about the cyclical behavior of the
data. The experimental part of the project consists in seeing whether
this prewar information provided a useful guide to the postwar behavior
of these data in relation to business cycles.
We had some basis for confidence that the prewar information would
provide a useful guide. The basis was the usual mixture of empirical
finding and theoretical reasoning. From the extensive studies of Mitchell,
Burns, and others it was plain that the alternating periods of expanding
and contracting economic activitydefinedasbusinesscycles were
NOTE: Based upon an address given at the Second Annual Midwest Conference on
Business Indicators, April 23,1955, sponsored by the Chicago Chapter, American
Statistical Association, and the Business Statistics Committee, Chicago Association of
Commerce and Industry. The text and charts have been extensively revised and brought
to date.
1Theirreport, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals, is reprinted here, Chapter 6.
2Thisreport, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions, is reprinted here,
Chapter 7. For a chart of the individual indicators (now brought up through 1958), see
Chapter 7, Chart 7.6.
'For the business cycle chronology, see Appendix A.
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characterized by a system of relations among different factors or aspects
of economic activity. Some of these relations repeated themselves more
frequently or more faithfully than others. Many of them could be ex-
plained or accounted for after a fashion, although the explanation of any
one of them was ultimately tied up with the explanation of the whole
system. But the system as a whole was extremely complex, both from a
statistical and an economic point of view. The problem, as Mitchell saw
it, called for an intricate scheme of statistical measurements covering
long historical periods, and for careful economic analysis of the many
sectors—production, consumption, income, finance, prices, inventories,
and so on—that seemed to bear an important share of responsibility for
the basic phenomenon, the business cycle.4
Our studies of indicators have cut through this broad research pro-
gram in a particular way and at a particular stage of its development.
In a sense, the selection of indicators was an attempt to get at and put
to use some of the more systematic repetitive relationships discovered
in the broad study. This accounts in part for the confidence with which
we viewed the indicators that were finally selected and also for some of
their limitations.
These limitations arise chiefly because it is impossible, in a set of
twenty-one time series selected for the relatively systematic behavior of
the economic processes they represent, to depict all the relationships that
contribute importantly to an understanding of the actual cyclical move-
ments of the economy. For one thing, it is clearly necessary to take into
account the less systematic factors. For example, there are only two series
in the list—bank debits and bank interest rates—that directly reflect the
operations of the banking system. This is not because banks are not
important. It is simply because, out of the twenty-five-odd series on
Federal Reserve System and member banks that we examined, not one
had behaved in a sufficiently systematic, repetitive manner during the
interwar period to pass the rather rigid statistical criteria we set up for
selecting indicators.
Another limitation is that, despite the considerable progress made in
the broad study, we still did not have an adequate "explanation" for
some of the systematic relationships that turned up. To take an interesting
example, we had long observed—indeed, Mitchell made some obser-
vations on it in his book on Business Cycles in 1913—that the aggregate
liabilities of business failures behave differently from the aggregate
number of failures. The liabilities make wider swings, and they usually
move earlier. Perhaps it is reasonable that deteriorating business con-
ditions should tend to increase the average size of firm that fails. Mitchell
'For a list of the studies using this scheme that have been published to date, see the
end of this volume.
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thought that the financial strains associated with recession forced larger
firms to the wall—firms that under prosperous conditions would seldom
fail. But why should the average size begin to shrink during a business
contraction while the number of failures is still increasing? And why,
during a business expansion, should the average size of failure begin to
rise while the number of failures continues to decline? We have some
plausible hypotheses about this, but we do not have a tested explanation,
even though the phenomenon has appeared again and again throughout
our business cycle history.5
Most of the prewar relationships exhibited by the twenty-one indi-
cators have survived a great many years and a wide variety of so-called
"structural" changes in the economy. And in most cases we do know
something about the reasons for these relationships. Personal income, for
example, was classed as a lagging series, though the fact that it was at
the top of the list of five laggers meant that its average lag in the prewar
period was shorter than that of any of the other four, and hence not
greatly different from those in the group called "roughly coincident."
In fact, the lags in personal income appeared mostly at business peaks.
The tendency to lag is accounted for by the behavior of the major com-
ponents of aggregate personal income.6 One of the most cyclically
sensitive components—labor income in manufacturing, mining, and
construction—has moved in virtually synchronous fashion with general
business activity, despite the fact that wage rates per hour lag.7 But all
of the other major components—labor income in the service industries
and in government, dividends, interest, and rental income—have tended
to lag behind turns in business activity, and these lags are occasionally
reflected in total income. The reasons for the lags seem to persist: the
stability of white-collar employment, the inflexibility of salaries, the
tendency for dividends to reflect past profits, and the contractual character
of interest and rents.
Despite all this, it would be difficult to classify total personal income
as a lagging series in the postwar period, although this tendency still
appears to be stronger at peaks than at troughs. It led by two months
at the November 1948 peak, lagged by three months and by one month
°Seethe essay on business failures by Zarnowitz and Lerner in Chapter 12.
See Daniel Creamer, Personal Income during Business Cycles, New York, NBER, 1956,
and Behavior of Wage Rates during Business Cycles, Occasional Paper 34, New York, NBER,
1950.
During 1929—58 the labor income series reached cyclical turns at precisely the dates
indicated by our business cycle chronology on no less than 7 out of 12 occasions. The
exceptions were a lead of one month at the February 1945 and July 1957 peaks, a lead
of two months at the November 1948 peak, a lag of four months at the October 1945
trough, and a lag of one month at the August 1929 peak (see Appendix B). Most of
the business cycle turns were dated without reference to the labor income series per Se,
and in all cases a wide variety of other information on business activity was taken into
account in choosing the dates.
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at the July 1953 and July 1957 peaks, respectively. It was coincident at
the October 1949 trough and led by five and by two months at the August
1954 and April 1958 troughs. The prompter upturns appear to be attri-
butable in part to the increasing importance of transfer payments, such
as unemployment compensation, which move countercyclically and hence
help to offset declines in other types of income. In 1958, for example, the
low point in total personal income came in February, but the low in
income minus transfer payments did not come until April.
Two observations sum up these remarks on the nature of our study of
indicators. First, whatever confidence the results deserve derives from
the fact that the economic relationships reflected by the indicators have
run the gauntlet of a changing environment and careful scrutiny in a
broad scientific study of business cycles. Second, whatever limitations
they may have arise because we do not know as much as we would like
to about these interrelationships, but we do know that the information
provided by these few series themselves is insufficient for a thorough-
going analysis. In view of these facts, it will certainly become necessary
and desirable—indeed it always has been—to revise and amplify this
list of twenty-one series. A step in this direction, based on studies com-
pleted since 1950, is taken in a later section of this paper.
A Test of the Selection and Classification of Indicators
To get back to the experiment itself; what can we say about our
results in the postwar period? As the illustration of personal income proves,
the behavior of some of the individual series is a bit out of line with what
might have been expected. Yet if we were to reclassify the twenty-one
series into the three groups (leading, roughly coincident, and lagging)
taking into account the postwar information, the only series that should
be shifted would be personal income, retail sales, and corporate profits.
The first two now appear to be better classified in the roughly coincident
group, and the third in the leading group.8 Freight carloadings, classed
as roughly coincident in the prewar period, have shown long leads at
peaks in the postwar period, reflecting the declining trend of rail traffic.
Hence this series has become increasingly deficient as an indicator of total
Leads in corporate profits have been far more frequent than lags, and somewhat
more frequent than rough coincidences (leads or lags of three months or less).During
192 1—58 there were 12 leads, 10 rough coincidences (of which 3 were exact coincidences),
and 2 lags (see Appendix B). This record is based on a comparison of the quarterly turns
in profits, dated at the midmonth of the quarter, with the monthly business cycle turns—
our standard method of measuring leads and lags of quarterly series.If the profits turns
were compared with the quarterly reference dates, there would be more coincidences,
but no lags (9 leads, 10 rough coincidences—8 exact, and no lags).Tests have shown,
however, the standard method is a better procedure, in that it is more likely to yield
results similar to those that would obtain if the series were monthly instead of quarterly.
(See Measuring Business Cycles, p. 228.)
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business activity, although the upturns in carloadings have continued to
match closely those in business activity. The other series have all behaved
in a manner consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with their prewar
record (for the full record, see Appendix B). It is true that some leads
have been extremely long, like the twenty-month lead in the average
workweek at the 1957 peak, and some "extra" cycles have occurred, like
those in building contracts in 1950—51; but such things happened
occasionally in the prewar period too.
A comparison of the timing of each of the twenty-one indicators at
the three business cycle peaks and three troughs since 1948 with their
average timing through 1938 is made in Chart 3.l. The general con-
formity of the postwar to the prewar record is apparent, although at
peaks the leads of most of the leading and some of the roughly coincident
indicators have been substantially longer than the prewar average. The
results are summarized in Table 3.1 and merit careful study.
We learn, for example, that at the three postwar business cycle peaks
and three troughs the eight leading indicators (col. 5) led on thirty-four
occasions (lines 6 and 7), coincided three times (line 8), and lagged once
(lines 10 and 11). However, there were eight occasions when one or another
of them reached a (specific cycle) peak in the absence of a business cycle
peak with which it could be compared (line 4). Further, there were
ten instances (out of forty-eight possibilities) when a business cycle peak
occurred but no specific cycle peak that could be compared with it was
reached (line 3). This information is brought together in the latter part
of the table in the percentage distributions of the entries.
The first percentage distribution (lines 14 and 15) measures the extent
to which timing observations consistent with the classification of the
indicator have prevailed among all the timing observations. Thus, taking
the postwar peaks and troughs together, we find that the eight leaders
led in 93 per cent of the instances when a timing comparison could be
made, and lagged in 7 per cent (exact coincidences are counted as
half lead and half lag). The eight roughly coincident indicators roughly
coincided (turned within three months of the business cycle turn) 71
per cent of the time and failed to do so 29 per cent. The five lagging
indicators lagged 71 per cent of the time and led 29 per cent. Figures of
this type demonstrate the dependability of the classification in differenti-
ating leading, coinciding, and lagging indicators.
The second percentage distribution (lines 16—18) enables us to judge
the excellence ofsay, a leading indicator not only by its tendency to
lead rather than lag, but also by its ability to reach a corresponding turn
every time a business cycle turn occurs. Hence in line 16 the leads of the
For a test that bears in a different way on the timing of the indicators—in a way
not contemplated at the time they were selected, see Chapter 5.
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CHART 3.1 (concluded)
d No cyclical trough corresponding to October 1949 trough.
No cyclical trough corresponding to August 1954 trough.
No cyclical trough corresponding to April 1958 trough.
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leaders are compared with the total number of business cycle turns
covered by the series. In line 1 7 the lags of the leaders are taken as a
percentage of the same total, and in line 18 the percentage of business
cycle turns that are skipped is recorded. Similar entries are made for the
other groups of indicators.
Finally, the third distribution (lines 19—21) takes account of the
"extra" specific cycle turns—turns that occurred in the series in the
absence of a corresponding business cycle turn. Of all the specific cycle
turns observed, line 19 shows what percentage was consistent in timing
with the classification of the indicator, line 20 what percentage was in-
consistent in timing, and line 21 what percentage failed to match a business
cycle turn at all.
In summary, we can say that out of the 120 specific cycle turns in
the indicators, 70 per cent occurred where expected relative to business
cycle turns. We can also say that out of the 126 opportunities to match
TABLE 3.1
Prewar and Postwar Timing of Twenty-one Indicators
Prewar Business Cycle Peaks
and Troughs (to 1938")
Postwar Business Cycle Peaks
and Troughs (1948—58)
8 8 5 8 8 5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.Total business cycle
turns covered5 176 138 41355 48 48 30126
2.Total specific cycle
turns covered0 176 122 38 336 46 46 28 120
3.Business cycle turns -
not matched 17 19 5 41 10 6 4 20
4.Specific cycle turns
not matched 17 3 2 22 8 4 2 14
TIMING COMPARISONS
5.Total timing
comparisons: 159 119 36314 38 42 26106
6.Leads, 4 months &
over 90 26 4120 30 11 2 43
7.Leads, 1—3 months 34 24 4 62 4 12 4 20
8.Exact coincidences 10 29 4 43 3 12 3 18
9.Rough coincidences057 81 17155 8 30 14 52
10.Lags, 1—3 months 13 28 9 50 1 6 7 14
11.Lags,4months&over12 12 15 39 1 10 11
12.Consistent timing '
comparisonse 129 81 26236 35.5 30 18.584
13.Inconsistent timing
comparisons 30 38 10 78 2.5 12 7.522
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TABLE 3.1 (concluded)
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
14. Consistent timing 81 68 71 79
15. Inconsistent timing 19 32 29 21
16. Consistent timing 62 67
17. Inconsistent timing 25 17
18. Unmatched business
cycle turns 12 13 16
19. Consistent timing 66 70
20. Inconsistent timing 27 18
21. Unmatched specific
cycle turns





NOTE: The business cycle peak of February 1945 and trough of October 1945 and
specific cycle turns during 1939-45 are omitted. For data on peaks and troughs separately,
see Table 3.5 in the appendix.
Includes all specific and business cycle turns covered by each indicator or its historical
equivalent through 1937 (peaks) or 1938 (troughs). See Appendix B.
b Sum of lines 3 and 5.
Sum of lines 4 and 5.
d Includes leads of 1—3 months (line 7), exact coincidences (line 8), and lags of 1—3
months (line 10).
eForleading indicators, number of leads plus one-half the exact coincidences. For
roughly coincident, number of rough coincidences. For lagging, number of lags plus
one-half the exact coincidences.
Leads longer than 3 months.
Lags longer than 3 months.
business cycle turns, the indicators did turn according to their classi-
fication in 67 per cent of the cases. More of the "errors" were leads rather
than lags; that is,of the twenty-two timing observations that were
inconsistent with the classification of the indicators, 18.5, or 84 per cent,
were leads.'° The behavior of the leading series was somewhat more
10 This may suggest that the business cycle turns were placed too late.However,
although errors of a month or two in the reference dates are clearly possible, we do not
believe there is an appreciable bias in one direction or the other in the postwar period,
either absolutely or compared to the way these dates were selected in the prewar period.
Although there is a certain degree of redundancy in that some of the indicators (especially
the roughly coincident ones) play a large role in the selection of the reference dates
themselves, the effect of this on the results should not be exaggerated. While this fact
does imply that the turns in the roughly coincident indicators should center around the
reference dates, there is nothing in the method that necessarily makes them roughly
coincident. I.e. leads or lags longer than three months might predominate, even in this
group. Moreover, the relative timing of the three groups of indicators with respect to
one another is not affected by the choice of reference date.
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OF TOTAL TIMING COMPARISONS
72 75 93 71
28 25 7 29
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS CYCLE TURNS
73 59 63 66 74 62
17 28 24 22 5 25
10 14 12 12 21
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIFIC CYCLE TURNS
73 66 68 70 77 65
17 31 26 23 5 26









consistent with their classification as leaders than that of the other two
groups. Furthermore, the "errors" (lags in the case of leaders, leads in
the case of laggers) were clearly smaller, in average magnitude as well as
in number, than the "successes," as lines 22 and 23 of the table testify.
A "success" record of 67 per cent does not mean that in two out of
three business cycle turns the indicators worked out as expected whereas
in one out of three they did not. The record was fairly typical of each
business cycle turn in the postwar period. The following figures demon-
strate this point (see also Chart 3.1)."
Consistency of Timing of Twenty-one Indicators




Consistent Inconsistent UnmatchedActual Possible
Timing Timing Business Timing Timing
Corn- Corn- Cycle Corn- Corn-
Business Cycle Turn parisons parisons Turns parisons parisons
Peak, Nov. 1948 13 4 4 76 62
Trough, Oct. 1949 16.5 2.5 2 87 79
Peak, July 1953 14.5 1.5 5 91 69
Trough, Aug. 1954 11 4 6 73 52
Peak, July 1957 14 5 2 74 67
Trough, Apr. 1958 15 5 1 75 71
Total or average 84 22 20 79 67
These results underline the advantage, if not the necessity, of depend-
ing on groups of indicators rather than on any single one (of average
fallibility). If a substantial majority of a group of indicators behave as
expected at every business cycle turn, there is a good chance that the
analyst can form a correct judgment of affairs at every turn. Further
analysis of the behavior of the indicators as groups is undertaken in a
later section of this paper (see pp. 69ff.).
Perhaps the most instructive aspect of Table 3.1 is the comparison of
the postwar with the prewar record. Since the indicators were selected
on the basis of prewar records, it comes as no surprise that in the prewar
period the three groups of indicators behaved according to their classifi-
cation. What is significant, and encouraging, is the fact that the postwar
record is substantially the same as the prewar record. The prewar experi-
ence provides a standard to compare how frequently the timing of cyclical
turns in an indicator is consistent with its classification, as well as how
51Thisrecord does not include the 14 "extra" specific cycle turns, since these by
definition could not be matched with any single business cycle turn. In fact, however,
all of them occurred during the Korean War, 1950—52.
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frequently a series skips business cycle turns or reaches extra cyclical
turns. The postwar record stands up well against this rigorous yardstick,
although business cycle turns were skipped and extra cyclical turns were
reached somewhat more frequently in the postwar than in the prewar
period. On the whole, the indicators did as well in the postwar period as
could have been expected in the light of their prewar record.
A New List of Indicators
The three business cycles of the postwar period, 1946—58, provide a
substantial addition to our records of cyclical behavior. As noted above,
these records suggest that certain of the indicators should be reclassified.
Moreover, since several of the recent studies reported in this book provide
new information on specific indicators, it seems worth-while to take
account of all these results and produce a new list of indicators (Table
3.2 and Chart 3.2).
The new list, selected on the basis of the same criteria used in drawing
up the 1950 list, includes twenty-six indicators, of which twelve are
classified as leading, nine as roughly coincident, and five as lagging.
Fifteen of the twenty-six are on the 1950 list. Five more are substitutes for
closely related series on the 1950 list. A series on housing starts has been
substituted for residential building contracts, net change in the number of
operating businesses for new incorporations, Standard and Poor's com-
prehensive common stock price index for Dow-Jones' industrials, industrial
materials spot market price index for the more comprehensive basic
commodities price index, and a series on the rate of unemployment for
total unemployment. One indicator on the 1950 list has been dropped:
freight carloadings. Six series have been added: gross accession or hiring
rate, layoff rate, and change in business inventories to the leading group;
GNP in constant prices to the roughly coincident group; and plant and
equipment expenditures and wage and salary cost per unit of output to
the lagging group. In addition, three series have been reclassified:
corporate profits from the roughly coincident to the leading group, and
personal income and retail sales from the lagging to the roughly co-
incident group (see the preceding section).
It is interesting to note, more as an indication of the revolutionary
changes during the past twenty years in the kinds of current statistics at
our disposal than anything else, that of the twenty-one indicators selected
by Mitchell and Burns in 1937, only three remain on our new list:
business failureliabilities(8.0),industrial production index(15.0),
and average workweek in manufacturing (1.0). In the case of many of the
others, we now have a more comprehensive measure of the same type of
economic activity. In addition, some economic processes are now repre-
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CHART3.2 (continued)










B.Nine Roughly Coincident IndicatorsSELECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF INDICATORS
CHART3.2 (concluded)
Ratio scales used throughout except for curves 1.0, 2,0, 3.0, 7.0, 11.0, 13.0, 14.0.
and 23.0.
Figures enclosed in rectangular boxes indicate the latest data plotted: Arabic numerals
indicate months; Roman numerals, quarters.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.




become available where before only annual figures existed: gross national
product, corporate profits, and inventories, for example.
As in any process of selection from a wide field, the margin of choice
between one indicator and another is often narrow. In order to widen the
range and record the merits, as cyclical indicators, of other series besides
the twenty-six listed in Table 3.2, a supplementary list is provided in
Appendix B. The supplementary series measure somewhat different
facets of the same economic processes. They include, among others, all
the series from the 1950 list that are not on the new list. Also included are
some series that, had they been readily available, might have been put
on the new list. For example, the series on new investment orders and
contracts (6.2) is a better measure of the commitment stage of investment
in plant and equipment than any series on the new list, but its com-
ponents are not as yet currently published. On the other hand, some of
the supplementary series are available more promptly but are less com-
prehensive or more erratic than those on the new list. For instance, the
series on temporary layoffs (3.1) is available more promptly than the
layoff rate (3.0), and insured unemployment (14.4) is available weekly
whereas total unemployment (14.2) and the unemployment rate (14.0)
are monthly. Each user of indicators must decide for himself whether he
wishes to obtain, say, a less comprehensive or more erratic figure at an
earlier date. From this point of view, it is to be noted that seven of the
indicators on the new list are available only quarterly. Perhaps in due
course some or all of them will become available monthly. In some in-
stances even now, a basis for constructing monthly estimates exists.
The timing record of leads and lags at business cycle turns for each of
the indicators on the new list is summarized in Table 3.2 and shown in
detail in Appendix B (together with the timing record for the supple-
mentary list). Current sources of data are given in Table 3.7 in the
appendix to this chapter and brief descriptions of the content of the series
and their historical sources are provided in Volume II. Measures of
erratic movements and periods of moving averages required to obtain a
specified degree of smoothness in each series are shown in Table 3.8 in
the appendix.
Although one of the chief purposes of this book, especially of Part
Two, is to develop a documented account of the cyclical behavior of the
indicators and their relations with one another and with other economic
processes, it may be helpful to bring together some of the essential points
from these analyses in notes for each of the twelve leading indicators on
the new list. The notes do not give the evidence, and in some instances go
beyond what is presented elsewhere in this book (references are provided).
They are intended to suggest what economic significance attaches to each
indicator and what reasons there are for supposing that its relation to
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certain other economic processes is such "that its future behavior in
regard to business cycles will be like its past behavior" (Chapter 6,
p. 166). Although the notes are restricted to the leading indicators, most
of the others are mentioned in one connection or another—this being a
token of their essential interdependence.'1
SENSITIVE EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT INDICATORS
1.0Average Hours Worked per Week, Manufacturing. Changes in the
workweek are usually made before corresponding changes in the number
employed because changes in hours are easier to administer, easier to
reverse if necessary, and sometimes reduce costs per hour (as when over-
time hours are reduced). These leads, averaging about four months,
have been found in numerous manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
industries. In manufacturing, however, the cyclical movements in the
workweek have been more sharply defined than in more comprehensive
workweek data. Diffusion indexes of the workweek, based on individual
industry data, lead the workweek proper and help to identify cyclical
turns in it. Cyclical turns in the gross accession rate in manufacturing
(2.0) also usually lead those in the workweek, and so do those in the
layoff rate, inverted (3.0). For a full account of these relationships, see
The Average Workweek as an Economic Indicator by Gerhard Bry (Occasional
Paper 69, New York, NBER, 1959). See also Chapters 15 and 16.
2.0Gross Accession Rate, Manufacturing. Changes in the accession rate
12Thetwo additions to the lagging group require comment. The series on plant
and equipment expenditures (220), representing one of the later stages of the investment
process, has tended to lag only briefly behind business cycle turns. Although the lags far
outnumber the leads, the series might almost equally well be classed as "roughly coinci-
dent."According to the entries inTable 3.2,which are based on quarterly data on expendi-
tures by manufacturing industries during 1919—38 and by all nonfarm industries since
1947, there are 12 lags at business cycle turns, 2 leads, and 14 "roughly coincident"
turns (leads or lags of 1—3 months and exact coincidences). The median of all timing
observations is a lag of one month. These figures are based on a comparison of quarterly
turns in the series, dated at the n-iidmonth of the quarter, with the monthly business
cycle dates. Comparison with the quarterly business cycle dates yields 8 lags of one
quarter and one of two quarters, 8 exact coincidences, and one lead of one quarter (cf.
note 8).
Wage and salary costs per unit of manufacturing output (23.0), as well as the related
series covering only production worker wage costs (23.1) and the more comprehensive
labor cost per dollar of real GNP (23.2), have consistently increased during the late
stages of business expansions and the early stages of contractions, and declined during the
late stages of contractions and early stages of expansions. Hence these unit costs can be
described as conforming positively to business cycles with a lag, or inversely with a lead.
This behavior is partly attributable to the vigorous rise in wage rates and hourly earnings
after a business expansion gets under way, and sheir slower rise or actual decline after a
business contraction begins, and partly to the tendency for output per man-hour to rise
most rapidly near the end of business contractions and the beginning of expansions. See
Chapter 16; also, ChangesinLaborCost During Cycles inProduction and Business, by Thor
Hultgren, Occasional Paper 74, New York, NBER, 1960, and The Behavior of Wage
Ratesduring BusinessCycles, by Daniel Creamer, Occasional Paper 34, New York, NBER,
1950.
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reflect the varying intensity of employers' efforts to increase the number
of persons they employ. Usually a number of months elapses after a down-
turn in the accession rate before it is reduced below the level of the separa-
tion rate (principally quits and layoffs), and a decline in employment
ensues. During this interval the workweek begins to fall. A similar sequence
follows upturns in the accession rate. Turns in help-wanted advertising
in newspapers (14.5) usually follow those in gross accession rates and the
workweek by a few months.
Since the hiring of labor is influenced by wage rates, labor costs per
unit of output (23.0—23.2), and profits (9.0—9.3), as well as by the estab-
lishment of new business enterprises and the liquidation of others
(7.0—7.3, 3.0—8.2), these series are particularly useful in analyzing cyclical
movements in the accession rate. Brief discussions of the accession rate
will be found in Chapters 15 and 16. See also "Three BLS Series as
Business Cycle Turn Signals," by Rudolph C. Mendelssohn, Monthly
Labor Review, September 1959.
3.0Lay off Rate, Manufacturing. Since layoffs constitute the chief instru-
ment whereby cyclical changes in unemployment occur, the layoff rate
is a strategic series for analyzing prospective changes in the level of
employment and unemployment. Layoffs are akin to additions to un-
employment and to reductions in employment, except insofar as those
laid off immediately obtain another job. Cyclical turns in the layoff rate,
which is the number laid off per hundred employed in manufacturing,
have nearly always preceded turns in unemployment (14.0—14.3) and
opposite turns in nonagricultural employment (13.0 and 13.3).
The number of persons on temporary layoff (3.1) has a broad indus-
trial coverage, but is far more erratic than the manufacturing layoff
rate, probably because the figures are based on a much smaller sample.
Data on temporary layoffs are available more promptly each month
than the layoff rate, and are comparable with other labor force data.
In fact, the number of unemployed (14.2) includes temporary layoffs.
The number of initial claims for unemployment insurance (3.2) also
may be considered in the same family as the layoff rate and temporary
layoffs. Initial claims data are available weekly and by geographic area
(see Chapter 18). For brief discussions of the layoff rate and related series,
see Chapters 15 and 16.
NEW INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS
4.0New Orders, Durable Goods Manufacluring Industries, Value. New
orders for durable goods is one of a large number of series that represent,
directly or indirectly, investment commitments by business enterprises or
individuals. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the volume of
activity in these early stages of the investment process tends to turn up or
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down before the aggregate volume of economic activity, as measured by
output, income, employment, or trade. (See Wesley C. Mitchell, What
Happens during Business Cycles, NBER, 1950, pp. 68—72, 158—70.) New
orders for durable goods in particular have shown a pervasive tendency
to lead business activity in general as well as the output of the industry
receiving the orders. Among the factors associated with the early declines
in orders during business expansions are unfavorable cost-price relations,
tight credit conditions, and piling up of inventories. Opposite conditions
are associated with the early upturns in new orders during contractions.
Data on unfilled orders are valuable adjuncts to new orders statistics,
since high backlogs may reduce the significance or delay the effect of
changes in new orders.
For an account of the cyclical timing of new orders, see Chapter 14.
See also "An Approach to Orders Analysis," by Walter W. Jacobs and
Genevieve B. Wimsatt, Survey of Current Business, December 1949. Addi-
tional orders series, including diffusion indexes, are listed in Volume II.
5.0Housing Starts, Number of New Dwelling Units. Since the series on
housing starts represents an early stage in the construction process, it
leads residential construction employment and expenditures, tends to
lead production of construction materials and appliances incorporated
in new housing, and has a bearing on demand for furniture and other
household furnishings. New orders for certain materials used primarily
in new housing, such as oak flooring, are closely related to starts. So, too,
are residential mortgage commitments. The starts figures, derived pri-
marily from building permit statistics, are less erratic in their month-to-
month movements than residential building contract awards (5.1),
are currently published more promptly than the contract figures, and are
published in seasonally adjusted form. The contract data, however, are
available in terms of floor space and value as well as number of dwelling
units. Since the starts are derived primarily from building permit statistics
on the basis of estimated lags between permit issuance and start of
construction, the original permit data show short leads relative to starts.
From 1956 the contracts series also is based largely on permit data.
Housing starts are sensitive to financial market conditions, construction
costs, marriage rates, vacancy rates, and changes in housing legislation.
For analyses of some of these factors, see Housing Issues in Economic Stabiliza-
tion Policy, by Leo Grebler (Occasional Paper 72, New York, NBER, 1960),
and "Forward Investment Commitments of Life Insurance Companies,"
by James J. O'Leary, in The Quality and Economic Signficance of Antici-
pations Data (Special Conference Series 10, Princeton for NBER, 1960).
6.0Commercial and Industrial Building Contracts, Floor Space. Like new
orders for equipment and housing starts, contracts for the construction of
factory and office buildings are a type of investment commitment, and
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are affected by similar influences (cf. notes on series 4.0 and 5.0). These
contracts, however, are more closely correlated with the level of business
activity than are housing starts, and probably are less sensitive to financial
market conditions. The monthly figures are highly erratic, although the
floor space figures are less so than the values. Quarterly estimates of new
capital appropriations (6.3), which begin in 1953, have been closely
correlated with commercial and industrial contract awards. Because of
the long period of construction, both series lead plant and equipment
expenditures (22.0) by intervals averaging from six to nine months.
Series 6.2 combines new orders for industrial equipment (6.1) with
contracts for industrial, commercial, and public utility construction
and hence approximates the coverage of plant and equipment expendi-
tures (see Chapter 14).
7.0Net Change in Number of Operating Businesses. This series, which is
the number of newly established business enterprises minus the number dis-
continued, has recently been put on a quarterly, seasonally adjusted basis
and on a prompt publication schedule. Although the number of new incor-
porations (7.1) has the advantage of monthly publication, it is occasion-
ally affected strongly by changes in legislation, especially in the tax laws,
which induce existing businesses to incorporate or to refrain from doing
so. Partly for this reason, and partly because the net change takes account
of discontinuances, the conformity of the net change to business cycles
in the postwar period has been better than that of new incorporations
or even the new business component of the net change (see Chapter 13).
The lead in the net change of the business population relative to
business activity derives primarily from the behavior of the number of
new businesses, since the number of discontinued businesses (failures
plus other discontinuances) is roughly coincident (inverted). As in the
case of other forms of investment commitment, the cyclical timing of new
business formation is associated with the behavior of profits. Widespread
increases in profits and profit margins seem to induce, after a brief lag,
the creation of large numbers of new businesses. As costs rise and profit
increases become less widespread in the later stages of a business cycle
expansion, the number of new businesses diminishes. Business contraction
reduces new business formation, but before the decline in aggregate
activity comes to a halt an increase in the number of firms and industries
experiencing rising profits induces a rise in business births. For these
reasons, and because the effect on investment of the creation of a new firm
is not equal and opposite to that of the discontinuance of an existing
enterprise, it is desirable to analyze business births and deaths separately,
as well as the net change. For analyses of the cyclical timing of new incor-
porations and business births, see Chapter 13; also G. Herberton Evans, Jr.,
Business Incorporatioiis in the U.S., 1800—1943, New York, NBER, 1948.
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PROFITS, BUSINESS FAILURES, AND STOCK PRICES
8.0Business Failures, Liabilities, Industrial and Commercial. Although
relatively few businesses fail, and the ostensible reasons for failure are
often not connected with the general state of business, the total number
and aggregate liabilities of business failures usually decline as business
improves and rise as business deteriorates. As a rule, the liabilities not
only lead business activity but also the number of failures, reflecting a
tendency for the failures of larger concerns to move ahead of those of
smaller concerns. Hence it is useful to observe the number of the larger
failures, e.g. those with liabilities of $100,000 or more (8.1 and 8.2).
In general, data on liabilities are more erratic than the corresponding
numbers of failures.
The large failures begin to increase before aggregate economic activity
turns down, probably as a result of a deterioration in conditions affecting
profits in the late stages of a business expansion. Higher costs, tighter
credit, and more exacting competitive conditions—all play a role. Large
failures continue to increase during the business contraction but typically
reach their peak and start declining before aggregate economic activity
turns up. Improvements in profit prospects in an increasing number of
industries, reductions in new business starts (which not only have a high
mortality rate but also stiffen competition), and reduced financial strains
help to explain this "lead." The lag of small failures behind large failures
may reflect delays occasioned by a lack of knowledge of the true condition
of the concern and the smaller losses that creditors have at stake. For an
analysis of the timing of business failures, see Chapter 12.
9.0Corporate Profits after Taxes. Actual and prospective profits play a
vital role in the generation of business cycles. By providing the incentive
as well as the wherewithal for investment, by generating optimism or
pessimism about the business outlook, by stimulating expansion or forcing
retrenchment, profits (and losses) occupy a strategic position in a private
enterprise economy.
For this reason it is well to keep currently in view various aspects of
the statistical picture of profits—profits before as well as after taxes,
retained earnings, profit margins per dollar of sales (9.3) and per unit of
output, the proportion of concerns making profits vs. those incurring
losses (9.2), and the proportion experiencing increases in profits vs. those
with declines (D 9.0, D 9.2). It is also well to analyze current trends in
factors affecting profits, such as new orders received (4.0), sales, prices
(21.0), and costs (23.0), and in factors reflecting profit expectations, such
as common stock prices (10.0), new businesses started (7.0), new orders
and contracts placed (6.2), and new capital appropriations (6.3).
For descriptions of the cyclical behavior of profits see Chapters 2, 8,
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11, and 12. The classical account of the role of profits in business cycles
is in Wesley C. Mitchell's Business Cycles, Berkeley, 1913; see reprinted
Part III, Business Cycles and Their Causes, Berkeley, 1941, especially pp.
149—162.
10.0Common Stock Price Index, Industrials, Rails, and Utilities. Among
the factors associated with the regularities in the behavior of stock price
indexes during business cycles, probably the most significant are profits
and interest rates. Declines in the level or rate of growth of profits or in
factors portending such declines—e.g. in profit margins (9.3) or new
orders (4.0)—during the later stages of business cycle expansions may
alter appraisals of common stock values and hence produce a decline in
stock prices before the downturn in business. At the same time, higher
interest rates and reduced availability of credit tend to lower capital
values, cause postponement of plans to exploit potentially profitable
investment opportunities, and make common stocks a relatively less
attractive form of security to hold and diminish incentives to borrow for
that purpose. Opposite changes occur during business contractions.
Since these factors also affect investment commitments, such commit-
ments often move closely with stock prices.
For analyses of the cyclical timing of stock prices, see Frederick R.
Macaulay, The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields, and Stock Prices
in the United States since 1856, New York, NBER, 1938; Arthur F. Burns,
Stock Market Cycle Research, New York, 1930; W. Braddock Hickman,
The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1953;
Factors Affecting the Stock Market, Staff Report to the Committee on Banking
and Currency, United States Senate, April 30, 1955; Edmund A. Mennis,
"Security Prices and Business Cycles," Analysts' Journal, February 1955.
For a diffusion index of stock prices, see Chapter 18.
INVENTORY INVESTMENT AND SENSITIVE COMMODITY PRICES
11.0Change inBusiness Inventories. Additions to or reductions in
business inventories (the value of the physical change) represent one of
the most volatile components of gross national product (16.0), and have
since 1939 shown a persistent tendency to reach cyclical turns, especially
peaks, before GNP. These leads do not mean that inventory change
becomes negative before peaks in output, but merely that the increases
become smaller, exerting a depressing influence on output. Similarly,
inventory change does not ordinarily become positive before troughs in
output; rather, the decreases become smaller, tending to lift output.
Evidence analyzed in a forthcoming report by Thomas M. Stanback
indicates that it is the purchased materials component of total inventory
change that is primarily responsible for the early timing of the total
(cf. Thirty-ninth Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
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May 1959, PP. 43-44). There is evidence, also, that the timing has
become earlier since World War II (cf. series 24.0).
For an account of the timing of inventory change, see the Stanback
report mentioned above, and Moses Abramovitz, Inventories and Business
Cycles (New York, NBER, 1950). A crude monthly index of inventory
change can be obtained by taking month-to-month changes in the book
value of total business inventories (manufacturers', wholesalers', and
retailers'). This is affected by inventory revaluations and hence moves
differently from the value of the physical change when price movements
are extensive.
12.0Industrial Materials Spot Market Price Index. This index includes
the daily prices of thirteen raw, or simply processed, materials. (steel,
copper and lead scrap, tin, zinc, rubber, hides, cotton, wool, print cloth,
burlap, rosin, and tallow) selected for sensitivity to forces acting on open
markets and organized exchanges. Pressures to build or to draw down
materials inventories tend to be reflected promptly in the index (see Ruth
P. Mack, "The Destabilizing Influence of Raw Materials Prices," Com-
pendium on The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth,
Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1958).
Its cyclical upswings and downswings usually begin before those in the
comprehensive wholesale price index (21.0), which includes quotations
that sometimes remain fixed for long periods. Retail price indexes usually
lag still more.
The materials price index is a component of the BLS daily index of
basic commodity prices (12.2). In recent years it has conformed more
closely to business cycles than the total, which includes prices of foodstuffs
that are subject to the vagaries of weather conditions and government
farm price policies.
An Amplitude-Adjusted Index of Leading Indicators
Returning to the problem of testing the indicators (in the ensuing
sections the 1950 list of twenty-one indicators is used), we may note
certain weaknesses in the method of observing leads and lags. The decline
in a particular indicator during, say, a business cycle contraction may
not be sufficiently clear, or large enough, or long enough, to warrant
identifying the decline as cyclical, in which case no lead or lag will be
recorded. Yet the movement may conform to the business cycle and even
exhibit a lead or lag. For example, in Chart 3.2, commercial and in-
dustrial building contracts (series 6.0) reached a low point during the
1953—54 contraction; this low led the business cycle trough, but it is not
recorded as a lead in Chart 3.3 because the decline was not considered
large or long enough to be marked as a cyclical contraction.
The idiosyncrasies of individual indicators will, of course, tend to
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"The span of the moving average used to smooth each series is shown in Table 3.3.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
disappearif they are combined in an index number. Such an index would
enable us to judge the performance of an entire group of indicators.
One of the problems, however, in constructing an index is to prevent those
indicators that typically move in large cyclical swings, such as new orders,
from completely swamping those that move in small swings, such as the
average workweek. A solution to this problem is illustrated in Chart 3.3.
Each of the eight leading indicators is adjusted so that it has approxi-
mately the same cyclical amplitude, on the average, as one of the
coincident indicators, the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial
production. The adjusted series are also smoothed by moving averages,
though thisis not essential. The amplitude adjustment converts the
cyclical swings in the several indicators to roughly the same average size,
but does not alter the relative magnitudes of the successive swings in each
indicator. The adjusted series are then combined into an index, as shown.
Since the adjusted series have roughly equal cyclical amplitudes, their
cyclical influence on the index is roughly equal. The index broadly
parallels the production index, but leads it by intervals in the neighborhood
of four to six months.'3
13Forfurther discussion of this index, see Chapter 19. For another type of amplitude
adjustment, see Chapter 18.
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Diffusion Indexes of Business Indicators
Another device that can be used to summarize the movements of
groups of series is a diffusion index, as shown in Chart 3.4. This is a simple
scheme for counting the directions of change in a group of indicators
and producing a sort of index number. The idea is merely to count the
number of items in any group that are rising at any given time, and to
take this as a percentage of the total number in the group. This is the
percentage expanding. If more series in the group are rising than falling,
the percentage will be above 50; if more are falling than rising, it will be
below 50. The percentage is called a diffusion index because it shows how
widely diffused expansion movements are in the sector observed.'4
In some instances it will do to say that a series is rising if this month's
figure, seasonally adjusted, is higher than last month's. But if the series
is very erratic, it is better to take a longer view, and see whether this
month's figure is higher than, say, three or six months ago. This way there
is a better chance that cyclical movements will dominate the result.
Unfortunately, however, the farther back we look, the less current our
observation on the cyclical movement is likely to be, at least at the turning
points. If inventories today are lower than they were a year ago, that
ma mean they are still declining, but it may not. Perhaps they turned
up a month or two ago. When a series behaves in symmetrical fashion
around its turning point, comparisons with the same month of the pre-
ceding year may tell us what the direction of cyclical movement was six
months ago, not necessarily what it is now.15
For this reason it is desirable to "center" the observations on directions
of change in the middle of the interval between the months compared,
and bring them up to date by tentative approximations. In the case of
an erratic series like liabilities of business failures, we determine its
direction of change by comparing figures six months apart; smooth series,
like manufacturers' inventories, are taken on a month-to-month basis.16
This in itself tends to produce a smoother diffusion index; if the same
interval were. used for each series, erratic factors that may affect a number
of series at once, such as a strike, would have a greater effect on the result.
The results of this process are recorded in Table 3.3. where the centered
directions of change for each indicator are shown. This gives a vivid
picture of how the recession of 1957—58 and the subsequent recovery
spread to different economic activities at different times. Despite the
14 For the series that usually decline when business rises and vice versa (e.g. business
failures, unemployment), we reverse the observed direction of change in determining the
number expanding. When a series shows no change, it is counted as one-half rising.
15 For further discussion of this point, see Chapter 17.
16 For the method of determining these intervals, see Chapter 7. For another method,
which yields somewhat shorter intervals, see Chapter 17.
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CHART3.4
Diffusion Indexes of Business Indicators, 1948—59
8 leading indicators
I






16 leading and roughly coincident indicators, teoding shifted forward 4 months
4 -----.. -'- •. 1..
1948'49 '50 '51 '52 '53 '54 '55'56'57 '58 '59
Computed from directions of change in centered moving averages applied to each
seasonally adjusted indicator; the number of rising indicators is taken as a percentage of
the total number in the group.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
smoothingdevices used, the diffusion indexes for the three groups of
indicators are erratic.'7 Nevertheless, they furnish useful information about
the movements of the indicators from which they are constructed. The
Another way to present the information contained in a diffusion index is to compute
what we call the cumulated net percentage expanding, by taking the net excess of the
percentage expanding (+) over the percentage contracting (—)andcumulating these
figures from month to month from the initial date of the index (or from any arbitrary
date). The resulting index is usually relatively smooth, and it reaches its peaks and troughs
when the ordinary diffusion index (percentage expanding) crosses the 50 per cent line.
Still another method of constructing a diffusion index is termed the average duration
of run and is explained in Chapter 20. This type of index is ordinarily somewhat smoother
than the percentage expanding, but it is more complicated to compute and to explain,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0SELECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF INDICATORS
diffusion indexes make it plain that the three groups have moved in
sequence.
Chart 3.4 also shows a diffusion index based on all twenty-one series
and, at the bottom, an index based on the eight leading and eight roughly
coincident series with the leading group shifted forward four months,
which was the average lead of this group in the prewar record. One of the
merits of this last arrangement is that it spreads the impact of short-run
fluctuations which may affect many series at the same time; the result
is a smoother diffusion index. Also, of course, since the leading series are
moved ahead by the amount of their average lead, the resulting diffusion
index should move in a fashion approximately synchronous with the
diffusion index for the roughly coincident series.
A further test of the behavior of the twenty-one indicators is shown in
Chart 3.5. Here we show the several diffusion indexes as they stood at
intervals during the 1957—58 and 1953—54 recessions and recoveries.18
Bear in mind that the chart shows the picture as it looked toward the close
of the months designated, which usually means that the latest available
data were for the preceding month. In January 1958, three months before
the business cycle trough was reached, nearly all the twenty-one indi-
cators were moving down. At this point the latest data available were
for December, in most instances, and there was no sign in these figures
that the contraction was near its end. In this respect the situation looked
less favorable than it did in May 1954, three months before the August
1954 upturn. By that time more than half of the leading indicators and a
few of the coinciding ones had begun to rise.
By April 1958, when March figures were available, there was evidence
of modest improvement in some of the leading series, but all of the coincid-
ing and the lagging series were moving down. Again the situation in
terms of these series looked much less favorable than it did at the August
1954 turn.
During the next three months further improvement occurred, so that
by July 1958 more than half the leaders had been rising for several
months, and exactly half the coinciding indicators were rising. By
October, expansion had become general, with all the leaders rising,
nearly all the coincident indicators rising, and about half the lagging
indicators rising. The 1958 reversal clearly came about much more
swiftly than that of 1954. In this respect it resembled the sharp upturns
in 1938 and 1924.
18Thecurves in successive panels differ slightly from one another and from those in
Chart 3.4 for three principal reasons: (1) revised data for individual series subsequently
became available; (2) seasonal adjustments for certain individual series were subsequently
revised; (3) preliminary estimates of changes in moving averages of individual series,
used to compute the percentage expanding, were revised when later data became avail-
able. For the same reasons, the contemporary record in Chart 3.5 differs slightly from
that shown in Table 3.3.
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CHART3.5






























Each panel is based on the figures that were available toward the close of the month
indicated, which in most instances means figures for the preceding month.
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It is important to be clear about what these results do not mean,
as well as what they do mean. They do not mean that one can get much
advance notice that a general business contraction is beginning or is
coming to an end. They do help one to recognize these events at about
the time they occur.19 Even then there is some risk of error. For Chart
3.4 shows, and the other charts provide additional evidence, that the
economy undergoes what might be called abortive movements that are
fairly general and show some of the same symptoms, yet do not develop
into the longer, deeper, and more general swings that we recognize as
business cycles.
Properties of Diffusion Indexes
We have constructed and examined a large number of diffusion
indexes, and have learned something about their properties and what
they have to tell about the condition of the economy. Chart 3.6 contains
a sprinkling of these indexes for the postwar period and Chart 3.7 carries
the story back to 1919. Let me enumerate some of the conclusions of our
studies, and illustrate them by reference to both charts.
1. Cyclical movements in the economy are general, but far from
perfectly general. For example, in the industrial production figures in
Chart 3.6, in only two months during the recession of 1953—54 were
more than three-quarters of the twenty-six major industry components
of the FRB index declining from one month to the next. Since 1949,
expansion has reached more than three-fourths of the industries at once
in only a few scattered months in 1950, 1952, 1954—56, and 1958.
2. There islittle evidence that cyclical movements have become
either more or less general in recent years, i.e. that there has been
a long-run trend one way or the other. Chart 3.7 provides some
evidence on this point. The curve labeled "business indicators" is the
same as the bottom curve on Chart 3.4, the combination of leading and
coincident indicators with the former shifted forward four months.
The curve labeled "153 series" is based on a sample of series representing
a fair cross section of different types or aspects of economic activity.
It is constructed by taking the directions of change in each series over
a twelve-month interval—the familiar comparison with the same month
of the preceding year. The result is plotted in the middle of the interval.
For example, the most recent figure is plotted in June 1954, and it is
based on a comparison, for each series, of December 1954 with December
'°Itis of interest to note, for example, that the July 1954 issue of Business in Brief,
published by the Chase National Bank, contained the following statement: "At present
all the leading indicators [selected by the National Bureau] point up, and half the coinci-
dent ones show an expanding trend. On this basis, the indicators point delinitely to an


























Indexes (4), (5), and (6) are based on directions of change in the component series
from the preceding month; (3) on changes from the preceding quarter; (I), (2), and (5)
over 3-month spans; and (7) over 4-quarter spans. Each index is plotted at the midpoint
of the span (or when the midpoint falls between 2 months, at the second month). Based
on seasonally adjusted components except (3) and (6), where the percentage expanding
is adjusted, and (7), which requires no adjustment because a 4-quarter span is used.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
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Based on directions of change from same month of preceding year, centered.
b Based on directions of change in centered moving averages of leading and roughly
coincident series, with leading series shifted forward four months.
C Based on directions of change during three-month spans, centered. See Chapter lB.
1 Dun and Bradstreet survey: manufacturers' sales. Based on directions of change
from same quarter of preceding year, centered.
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1953. The point is that both of the diffusion indexes that cover the inter-
war period seem to be undergoing much the same sort of swing since the
war that they did before the war. And when the interwar cycles are
compared with those before World War I(cf. Chapter 7, Chart 7.3),
it is clear that the phenomenon of imperfectly diffused cyclical movements
is of long standing.
3. The leads or lags that certain types of aggregates or indexes exhibit
relative to one another are usually reflected in diffusion indexes con-
structed from the components of the aggregates (see Chapters 8,14,
and 15). In Chart 3.6, for example, the diffusion index for the workweek
in twenty-one manufacturing industries shows a rather consistent lead
over the diffusion index for employment in all nonagricultural industries.
Changes in the workweek become diffused throughout industry more
promptly than changes in employment. A similar statement can be made
about diffusion indexes for new orders compared with those for pro-
duction. Plant and equipment expenditures, on the other hand, show a
distinct lag, and so do prices.
4. The scope of a business cycle expansion diminishes before the peak
in aggregate activity is reached, and the scope of a contraction diminishes
before the trough in aggregate activity is reached. The shaded areas in
the several charts represent our best judgment on the location of the
contractions in aggregate economic activity. There seems to be a tendency,
in most of the diffusion indexes we have constructed, for the indexes to
reach their peaks and troughs some six to twelve months ahead of these
peaks and troughs in aggregate activity, although the lead intervals have
sometimes been shorter than six months and occasionally longer than
twelve. A long historical record and an extensive array of data support
this observation as Charts 3.6 and 3.7 show (see also Chapter 8). The
latest illustration occurred in 1957—58. Most of the diffusion indexes in
our collection reached troughs and began rising late in 1957 or early in
1958, indicating a decline in the scope of the contraction. But none of
the principal aggregative measures of activity, such as income, employ-
ment, or production, reached their troughs before February 1958, and
many continued to decline until April or later.
5. Once expansion in the economy has become general, when measured
by a wide variety of factors bearing on the economic well-being of the
country and in such a way that the cyclical movements in the factors are
exposed, it stays general for a considerable period. These periods are
usually longer than those in which contraction is general. The proviso
about measurement is important, for it is also true that there are shorter
swings that are often quite general, especially when the directions of
change are measured over brief intervals of a month or two.
Chart 3.7 makes this point emphatically. The top line is based on
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153seriescovering such itemsasproduction and transportation,
employment and hours of work, domestic and foreign trade, new orders
and construction contracts, commodity prices, inventories, wage rates
and earnings, interest rates, and financial activities. And each series is
viewed in the perspective provided by a comparison with its level a year
earlier. Over such an interval, broad cyclical swings are likely to dominate,
especially if observation is confined to directions of change. And when
the results are put together for the whole collection of series, this is what
we find: the diffusion index remained above 50 per cent from August
1921 to August 1923, i.e. 25 months; from May 1924 to May 1926,
again 25 months; from August 1927 to April 1929, 21 months; from
December 1932 to April 1937, with a one-month interruption (in March
1934), 53 months; and from September 1949 to May 1953, again with an
interruption of one month (in September 1951), 45 months. The index
moved above 50 per cent again in June 1954. Similar broad swings are
displayed by the diffusion index going back to 1885 in Chapter 7 (Chart
7.3), which is based not on the movements of the component series over
uniform twelve-month intervals, but on movements between cyclical
peaks and troughs identified historically in each series.
On the other hand, the diffusion index based on business indicators
(Chart 3.7, third line) takes a shorter-run view. The current month's
level of each indicator is compared with that of the preceding month or
a few months earlier. Despite the fact that this index covers a rather wide
variety of information (though it contains a much smaller number of
separate series than the other indexes), and despite the smoothing effect
produced by postdating the leading series, the index flutters around a
good deal, and crosses above and below the 50 per cent line quite fre-
quently. So, too, does the index (Chart 3.7, second line) comprised of
nearly 300 series, which is based on a three-month span. The same is
true of those indexes in Chart 3.6 which are based on short-run com-
parisons.
These considerations pose a dilemma. In order to detect major turns
in the business cycle when they occur, one must take a short-run view;
otherwise the turn will be discovered only long after the event. But the
short-run view is likely to uncover minor as well as major turns.
One possible way out of the dilemma is suggested by the bottom curve
on Chart 3.7, the anticipations survey. The Dun and Bradstreet survey
of manufacturing concerns, wholesalers, and retailers inquires whether
sales, orders, employment, prices, profits, and inventories are up or down
in the most recent quarter compared with a year ago. The percentage of
companies reporting increases in sales is the line labeled "actual." The
survey also asks about expected results in the second quarter ahead
compared with the same quarter a year earlier. The actual and expected
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points are each plotted in the middle of the year to which they refer,
although the expected figure was available six months earlier than the
actual.2° Both the actuals and the expecteds trace a smooth course
broadly similar to that followed by the other diffusion indexes. However,
the expecteds appear to lag behind the actuals by about one quarter.
Except for the lag, one could say that the expectations offer a way of
bringing comparisons based on a yearly interval virtually up to date.
For another example, see the actual and expected diffusion indexes for
plant and equipment expenditures in Chart 3.6.
What the analyst must do to get out of the dilemma caused by the
short-run ups and downs in economic activity is to seek, and wait for,
confirmation. There are many ways of seeking it in the materials discussed,
as well as in other'materials. When we know more about the economics of
the short-run swings, we may be better able to recognize them as and
when they occur. A last resort—and indeed the only sure way out—is
to wait for confirmation in the course of events. For example, in the spring
of 1954 there was a fair amount of evidence in the kinds of data presented
here that the business contraction, which until then had pursued a
relatively moderate course, would be short-lived.This conclusion
turned out to be correct, but at the time it was certainly conceivable
that it could have been wrong. By midsummer there was stronger support
for this conclusion. If the opposite conclusion had been reached originally,
the evidence for it would have become weaker, and it might then have
been abandoned. Still later in the year, after the recovery had actually
got under way, there was still some uncertainty about whether the
recovery would be abortive and the contraction would resume its course.
Later on, even that uncertainty was dissipated. Similar remarks might
be made about the upturn in 1958.
The business forgcaster operates in a continuum, and the evidence
for or against the judgments he must make from time to time accumulates
month after month. This must be recognized if one is to take a responsible
attitude toward policy, whether private or public. Flexible and relatively
inexpensive policies can be undertaken promptly, before there is a heavy
preponderance of evidence in their favor, for they can be reversed if the
evidence turns against the forecast. Decisions on policies that are irrevers-
ible and expensive should wait until the evidence in their favor has
accumulated; if it fails to accumulate a costly mistake will have been
avoided.
20Forexample, the point on the "expected" curve based on the survey taken in
April 1955 covering expected changes between III 1954 and III 1955 is plotted in
February 1955, the midmonth of the year referred to. The "actual" figure obtained in the
same survey shows changes between I 1954 and I 1955, and is plotted in August 1954; the
expected figure for 11954 to I 1955 was obtained in the survey taken in September 1954.
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6. The scope of a contraction shortly after it begins is correlated,
though often only loosely, with the severity of the contraction. The
significance of this association, however, must still be assessed from both
an economic and a statistical point of view. Our studies of it have not
gone sufficiently far to yield a clear answer.21 On the statistical level,
the association is relatively slight when diffusion is measured by short-run
direction of change, apparently because such indexes are relatively un-
stable. The association is considerably closer when diffusion is measured
by longer-run directions of change. For example, the 153-series index in
Chart 3.7 crossed from above to below the 50 per cent line on ten occasions
in the 28 years 1919—38, 1947—54. There were only seven business cycle
contractions in this period; the three "extra" movements occurred in
1926—27, 1934, and 1951. Next, consider the level that the index reached
three months after it crossed below the 50 per cent line. It reached a level
around 30 per cent in three instances, a level of 35—45 per cent in five
instances, and rose above 50 per cent in the other two instances. Now
the three occasions when the index fell to 30 per cent at this stage occurred
in 1921, 1929, and 1937; and these were the three most severe depressions
that we have had since 1919. The five occasions when the index fell to
35—45 per cent occurred in 1923, 1926—27, 1948, and 1953; these were
relatively mild or moderate contractions. And the two occasions when
the index rose promptly above 50 per cent after having fallen below it
occurred in 1934 and 1951, where we have not seen fit to recognize a
business contraction at all.
Now there is no magic in the three-month interval. Thcre is a modest
degree of correlation at two months, and somewhat more at four, five,
or six months. However—and this is a very important qualification—the
level of this particular index three months after it reached 50 per cent
could not be observed at that time, because it is centered. For example,
it reached the 50 per cent line in May 1953; three months later would be
August. But the figure entered in August is based on a comparison of
February 1953 with February 1954. Data for February 1954 would have
been required to compute the index, and it would have taken at least
another month to get most of the figures. By that time, of course, the
contraction was well under way.
It is difficult, therefore, to attribute much significance to this corre-
lation from a forecasting point of view. It may be of value in situations
in which the character of the decline in business activity is still uncertain
after a considerable period, i.e. nine or ten months, has elapsed. This
may have been the case in 1954 and 1949, perhaps even 1930, as those
who recall public discussions of the matter in the early months of those
21Fora review of the evidence, see Chapter 8. See also Henry Platt, "An Analysis of
the Structure of National Income with a View to Short-Run Forecasting," Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Columbia University, 1957.
85PART ONE
years can testify. It was certainly not the case in 1937, when conditions
deteriorated rapidly, and probably not in 1921. To sum up, the relation-
ship serves to confirm or modify judgments reached at an early stage in a
developing situation. Also, by careful use of anticipatory surveys, it may
be possible to obtain the result faster. More work needs to be done both
to explain the hypothesis that the scope of a business contraction in its
early stages has a significant bearing on its later development, and to
make practical use of this hypothesis if it stands up under examination.22
Depressions have at least three dimensions, not just two: depth,
duration, and diffusion. This last dimension has long figured in practical
discussions of the business outlook, when, for instance, references are made
to a broad recovery, or to widespread depression, or to localized unemploy-
ment. A diffusion index simply provides a measure for it, one that can be
compiled currently and studied historically. The accuracy with which
most of our diffusion indexes mirror economic developments emphasizes
the importance of this dimension in any analysis of the business situation.
Further, our results underline the importance of policies that have a
general effect upon the economy. By the same token, they make apparent
the need to find out how general the effects of different policies are.
Perhaps they provide a tool that will help us to obtain that knowledge.
Measuring the Vigor of a Business Recovery
Let us return once more to the twenty-one indicators and some
additional measures constructed from them (Table 3.4). These measures
illustrate how current developments during a recovery period, like that
of 1954—55, can be put in a useful perspective.23 Like the indicators them-
selves, the measures are a by-product of the National Bureau's study of
business cycles.
The table was drawn up originally to test the common view that the
strength of a recovery in its early stages depends upon the level from
which it starts. An appropriate measure of that level is provided by the
magnitude of the preceding contraction. In other words, it might be
expected that moderate contractions would give rise to moderate re-
coveries, severe contractions to vigorous recoveries. Consequently the
columns in the table are arranged from left to right according to the
severity of the preceding contraction: the recovery beginning in November
1927, on the left-hand side, followed the mildest contraction in our business
cycle chronology; the recovery beginning in March 1933, on the right-
hand side, followed the greatest contraction of them all. The 1953—54
22Forfurther work on the identification of severe contractions, not only by diffusion
indexes but also by another approach, see Chapter 5.
23Unlikethe other materials in this paper, Table 3.4 has been left as it was when
presented in April 1955. For a fuller and more up to date presentation, covering recessions












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































contraction ranks next to the mildest, followed closely by 1948_49.24
Now it is interesting to observe that the recoveries in the FRB production
index, on line 13 in the table, rank in precisely the order of the severity
of the preceding contractions. In this respect, the FRB index is virtually
unique, but many of the other series show a roughly similar pattern,
and the hypothesis underlying the table is substantially supported. Judged
on this scale, the 1954—55 recovery, after the first seven months, seemed
to be more or less in line with what one would expect in view of the
moderate contraction that preceded it.
Further investigation of business cycle recovery periods suggests the
following tentative conclusions:
1. Recoveries in output, employment, and profits have usually been
faster after severe depressions than after mild contractions.
2. Despite the faster pace after severe contractions, recovery to the
previous peak level has taken longer when the preceding contraction
has been severe.
3. Nearly every business expansion has carried total output, employ-
ment, and profits beyond the level reached at the preceding peak.
4. The rate of growth in output, employment, and profits has usually
been largest at the initial stages of a business expansion. Thereafter,
slower growth has been the rule, especially after the preceding peak
level has been regained.
5. Stock prices, unlike output, employment, or profits, have advanced
more rapidly after mild recessions than after severe contractions.
Chart 3.8 shows how long it has taken for industrial production to get
back to its pre-recession level after each of seven business cycle contractions
since 1920. The mildest contraction, judged not by production alone but
by several indicators,is at the top, the most severe at the bottom.
Recoveries took six to nine months after the mildest contractions, fifteen
or sixteen months after the severe contractions of 1921 and 1938, and
nearly four years after the 1929—33 catastrophe.
These intervals apply to industrial production, not necessarily to
other measures of economic activity. For example, by the end of the first
six months of the recovery that began in April 1958, four of the eight
leading indicators (stock prices, residential building contracts, commercial
and industrial building contracts, and new incorporations) had already
recovered to the level on which they stood when the recession began in
July 1957. Two of the eight roughly coincident indicators (bank debits
and wholesale prices) and one of the five lagging indicators (personal
income) had also recovered tothis extent. The remaining fourteen
24Thisranking depends in part on the particular measure used to obtain it, and is
tentative and provisional. For further analysis, see Chapter 5. For a listing of cyclical
amplitudes of three indexes of business activity during 25 business cycles, 1854—1958,
see Table 3.6.
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CHART3.8
Months Required to Regain Previous Peak Level of Industrial Production
after Business Cyde Contractions of Different Severity
Total Percentage Decline During Months Required to Regain Peak Level
Business Cycle Contraction after Business Cycle Trough°






















a Interval from the business cycle trough to the first month in which the Federal
Reserve Board index of industrial production equaled or exceeded its three.month
average centered on the preceding business cycle peak. See Chapter 5, Table 5.9.
indicatorswere still below their mid-1957 levels, though most of them had
recovered to some extent.25
From Chart 3.9, which is arranged in the same way as Chart 3.8,
we find that recoveries in industrial production proceed at a faster
percentage rate after severe contractions. This is true whether one looks
at the rates of growth for the first six months (shaded bars) or for the
first two years following business cycle trough (white bars). Note that
the percentage rates are computed on the base of the preceding peak
figure, rather than in the usual fashion with the trough figure as the base
(which is used in Table 3.4). This method reduces the calculated rates
of recovery from severe contractions, since in such instances the preceding
peak is much higher than the trough. Hence the recovery rates following
severe and mild contractions become more nearly alike, although the
tendency for higher rates to follow severe contractions is still perceptible.
A striking feature of Chart 3.9 is that the rate of growth during
the first six months of each recovery is much greater than during the first
two years, usually about twice as great. This may be partly attributable
to the ease with which output can be expanded from a low level by
increasingthe workweek, hiringpreviously unemployed orpartly
°°Foradditional illustrations of the timing of recovery in this sense, see Chapter 5.
89
July 1953 Aug. 1954
Nov.1948 Oct. 1949
May 1923 July 1924
July 1957 Apr.1958




Rates of Increase in Industrial Production Following Business
Cycle Contractions of Different Severity
Total Percentage Decline During
Business Cycle Contraction









Percentage declines and increases are computed on the base of the three-month
average centered on the business cycle peak.
Based on Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production, adjusted for seasonal
variation.
employedworkers, and utilizing unused plant capacity. It may also be
attributable to the lower level to which costs (labor costs per unit of
output, material prices, interest rates) have usually fallen, both absolutely
and relative to finished goods prices, and to the demand for output to
fill up inventory pipelines. Once physical limitations begin to impose
themselves, and costs begin to mount, and inventory accumulation is
less pressing, the rate of growth of output tends to slacken.
It should not be inferred from Charts 3.8 and 3.9 either that business
expansions stop when output has regained its pre-recession level, or that
they always last two years, no more and no less. Chart 3.10 shows that the
median duration of business cycle expansions since 1854 has, in fact, been
about two years (twenty-seven months), but variations have been wide.
Few expansions have been shorter than a year and a half, and few longer
than three years, except when a major war intervened. But the range is
not narrow enough to be of much help in saying how long any given
expansion will last when it has just begun. The same can be said of
contractions, although they have typically been shorter than expansions,
especially in recent years.





Oct. 1926 Nov. 1927
July 1953 Aug. 1954
Nov. 1948 Oct. 1949
May 1923 July 1924
July 957 Apr. 1958
Jan. 920 July 1921
May 1937June 1938
Aug.1929 Mar.1933Duration is measured from monthly business cycle trough to peak and peak to trough
(see Appendix A).
Relative magnitude is based on the average rise or fall in three indexes of business
activity (see Table 3.6 in the appendix to this chapter).
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CHART3.10
Duration and Magnitude of Business Expansions and Contractions
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during a business contraction and the rise during the succeeding expansion
has been a longstanding one—witness the roughly parallel movements of
the two lines at the bottom of the chart.
History teaches that every business cycle can be different, can develop
unprecedented or at least unusual features. It behooves us, therefore, to
be in a position continuously to re-examine and reappraise the situation
as it develops. We should be prepared not only for the surprises that are
unquestionably in store, but also to distinguish the surprises from the
developments that are more or less to be expected. The method illus-
trated in Table 3.4 can be used to appraise a business cycle recovery
month by month as it develops; to measure its vigor, scope, and unusual
features; to derive some rough notions of its probable course and duration;
and to check the reasonableness of forecasts constructed by other means,
always remembering that typical rates of recovery and patterns of change
vary from one measure of economic activity to another. The figures can
be graphed and kept up to date on the plan used in Chart 3.11, which
compares the 1958—59 recovery with other business recoveries since 1920.
The chart is constructed by converting each indicator, starting at the
business cycle trough month (or quarter), to a percentage of its level
(three-month average) at the preceding business cycle peak. This pre-
ceding peak level is not necessarily the highest point reached by the
indicator itself, since some indicators will have begun to decline before
the business cycle peak and others afterwards. Similarly, the business
cycle trough is not necessarily the lowest level reached by the particular
indicator. The initial ratio for each series and for each recovery period
simply measures the level of the indicator when the recovery started
relative to its level when the contraction began. These positions are
plotted in the first column of points at the left of the chart. The points
are numbered from (1) to (8) in order of the severity of the preceding
contraction, starting with the mildest (see Chapter 5). Except for the
1958—59 recovery (5), the points are plotted only every six months to
simplify the chart; the intervening points can be filled in if needed from
the tables given in Appendix C. Like-numbered points can be connected
by straight lines to show rates of increase during each recovery.
The chart makes clear once more that the severity of the business
contraction is one of the principal factors affecting both the length of
time required to regain the pre-recession level of output, employment,
or profits, and the position attained relative to this level at any given time
during the recovery period. The tendency for slower growth after an
initial upsurge is also shown. Forecasts based on the growth rates that
prevailed during, say, the first two years of recovery would usually
understate the increases achieved during the first six or twelve months.
Correspondingly, an extrapolation of initial rates of increase would usually
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overshoot the mark actually attained by the end of two years. This type
of retardation has been sharper in the workweek than in employment,
sharper in industrial production than in gross national product, sharper
in profits than in production, and barely perceptible in stock prices.
The stock price chart (panel 7) has some interesting features. The
left-hand column of points shows that in a recession the market has tended
to react more or less in line with other indications of the recession's
severity, since the points are in rough numerical order. However, in
each of the four milder recessions (nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4), by the time the
low in business activity had been reached, the stock price index had more
than recovered the level on which it stood when the recession began.
Further, the market tended to react with confidence during the recovery
after a mild recession and with much less confidence after a severe one.
The largest increases in stock prices over their pre-recession levels have
occurred after mild recessions.
Although an analysis of the type illustrated in these charts provides
a useful perspective and a convenient way to measure the progress of
recovery, it is nevertheless only a beginning. Economic change cannot be
understood in terms of global figures such as industrial production, total
employment, or aggregate profits alone. Moreover, one of the implications
of the charts, that the character of a recovery depends on the kind of
recession that preceded it, is only a partial truth. Developments during
the recovery itself will certainly influence its course and progress, and
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CHART3.11 (continued)
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CHART3.11 (continued)
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CHART3.11 (concluded)
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Numeralsidentify business cycle recovery periods, arrayed in order of the severity
of the preceding contraction (mildest first). The monthly and quarterly trough dates
with which the recoveries begin are: (I) Nov. 1927, IV;(2)Aug. 1954, III; (3) Oct. 1949, IV;
(4) July 1924, Ill; (5) April 1958, II; (6) July 1921, III; (7) June 1938, II; (8) March 1933, I.
For the preceding peak dates, see Appendix A.
SouRcE: Appendix C.
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Appendix
1011. Total business cycle
turns coveredt
2. Total specific cycle
turns covered0
3. Business cycle turns
not matched




6.Leads, 4 months &
over 40
7.Leads, 1—3 months 20
8.Exact coincidences 2
9.Rough coincidences031
10.Lags, 1—3 months 9








Prewar and Postwar Timing of Twenty-one Indicators,





In- In- In-In-In- In- In-In-
dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-
tOrs torstorstorstorstorstorstors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PREWAR BUSINESS CYCLETHREE POSTWAR BUSINESS CYCLE
PEAKS (To 1937) PEAKS (1948—57)
86 68 19173 24 24 15 63
85 59 18162 22 23 14 59
10 11 2 23 6 3 2 11
9 2 1 12 4 2 1 7
Timing Comparisons
57 17150 18 21 13 52
9 2 51 17
7 0 27
12 2 16 1







5 10 9 24 6 6
61 38 14113 17.5 13 11 41.5
15 19 3 37 0.5 8 2 10.5
Average Lead (—)orLag (+)(inmont/is)
14. Consistent timing
comparisons —8.0+0.7+4.9 —18.8—0.6+3.8
15. Inconsistent timing —9.9k —l4.O
comparisons +3.9+7.7 —2.8 0 —1.0
16. Alltimingcomparisons —5.6+0.2+3.6 —2.4 —18.3—5.7+3.0 —7.9






In- In- In-In-In- In- In-In-
dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-dica-
torstorstorstorstors torstorstors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PREWAR BUSINESS CYCLETHREE POSTWAR BUSINESS CYCLE
TROUGHS (TO l938) TROUGHS (1949—58)
1. Total business cycle
turns covered5 90 70 22182 24 24 15 63
2. Total specific cycle
turns covered0 91 63 20174 24 23 14 61
3. Business cycle turns
not matched 7 8 3 18 4 3 2 9
4. Specific cycle turns
not matched 8 1 1 10 4 2 1 7
Timing Comparisons
5. Total timing
comparisons: 83 62 19164 20 21 13 54
6.Leads, 4 months
& over 50 17 2 69 13 3 2 18
7.Leads, 1—3 months 14 17 4 35 4 6 3 14
8.Exact coincidences 8 17 2 27 2 8 1 10
9.Rough coincidencesd26 43 11 80 7 17 7 31
10.Lags, 1—3 months 4 9 5 18 1 3 3 7
11.Lags, 4 months &
over 7 2 6 15 1 4 5
12.Consistent timing
comparisonse 68 43 12 123 18 17 7.543
13.Inconsistent timing
comparisons 15 19 7 41 2 4 5.5 11
Average Lead (—)orLag (+)(inmonths)
14. Consistent timing
comparisons —6.4—0.3+7.5 —4.8—0.4+4.1
15. Inconsistent timing —8.4
comparisons +5.5+5.5 —3.6 +1.0 —3.0
16. Alltimingcomparisons —4.3—2.4+3.4 —2.7—4.2—1.0+1.1 —1.7
NOTE: The business cycle peak of February 1945 and trough of October 1945 and
specific cycle turns during 1939—45 are omitted.
Includes all specific and business cycle turns covered by each indicator or its historical
equivalent through 1937 (peaks) or 1938 (troughs). See Appendix B.
Sum of lines 3 and 5.
C Sum of lines 4 and 5.
d Includes leads of 1—3 months (line 7), exact coincidences (line 8), and lags of 1—3
months (line 10).
O For leading indicators, number of leads plus one-half the exact coincidences. For
roughly coincident indicators, number of rough coincidences. For lagging indicator
number of lags plus one-half the exact coincidences.
Leads longer than 3 months.
Lags longer than 3 months.
103PART ONE
TABLE 3.6
Average Amplitude of Rise and Fall in Three Indexes of Business














Dec. 1854 June 1857 12.3 68June 1857Dec. 185821.0 96
Dec. 1858Oct. 1860 16.8 93Oct. 1860 June 186114.1 65
June 1861Apr. 1865 18.1 100Apr. 1865Dec. 186711.4 52
Dec. 1867 June 1869 6.9 38June 1869Dec. 1870 7.9 36
Dec. 1870Oct. 1873 18.4 102Oct. 1873Mar. 187926.9 123
Mar. 1879Mar. 1882 27.6 152Mar. 1882May 188527.9 128
May 1885Mar. 1887 22.7 125Mar. 1887Apr. 188811.2 51
Apr. 1888July1890 16.6 92July1890May1891 17.0 78
May 1891Jan. 1893 16.3 90Jan.1893 June 1894 30.7 141
June 1894Dec. 1895 25.3 140Dec. 1895 June 189724.3 111
June 1897 June1899 26.6 147June 1899Dec. 1900 14.4 66
Dec.1900Sep. 1902 14.2 78Sep. 1902Aug. 190414.4 66
Aug. 1904 May 1907 20.2 112May 1907June 190829.5 135
June 1908Jan. 1910 25.6 141Jan.1910Jan.191212.0 55
Jan.1912Jan. 1913 13.6 75Jan.1913Dec. 191423.2 106
Dec. 1914Aug. 1918 29.8 165Aug. 1918Mar. 191922.0 101
Mar. 1919Jan. 1920 17.9 99Jan.1920 July 192134.7 159
July 1921May 1923 38.0 210May 1923July 192421.8 100
July 1924Oct. 1926 17.8 98Oct. 1926Nov. 19279.3 43
Nov. 1927Aug. 1929 16.7 92Aug. 1929Mar. 193375.1 344
Mar.1933 May 1937 63.7 352May 1937June 193845.4 208
June 1938Feb. 1945 72.7 402Feb. 1945Oct. 194541.0 188
Oct. 1945Nov. 1948 14.7 81Nov. 1948Oct. 194917.5 80
Oct. 1949July 1953 23.9 132July 1953Aug. 195414.3 66
Aug. 1954July 1957 13.9 77July 1957Apr. 195822.7 104
Median rise, 1854—1957 18.1 100Median fall, 1857—195821.8 100
104SELECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF INDICATORS
Footnotes to Table 3.6
NOTE: Since 1879, the figures are averages based on three trend-adjusted indexes:
American Telephone and Telegraph Company index of business activity, index of
industrial production and trade constructed by Warren M. Persons and continued by
Barron's Publishing Company, and Ayres' index of business activity compiled by the
Cleveland Trust Company. Before 1879, the entries are for Ayres' index alone. The
rise from the specific cycle trough to specific cycle peak in each index is taken as a percent-
age of the average level of the index during the full specific cycle (trough to trough), and
the fall from specific peak to specific trough is taken as a percentage of the same base.
The amplitudes of the three indexes were considered sufficiently alike to warrant averag-
ing: for the period 1879—1949 the average rise during specific cycle expansions was 27.3
(AT&T), 26.8 (Persons), and 25.9 (Ayres); the corresponding averages for contractions
were 26.9, 25.8, and 25.8. This table is an extension of Table 156 in Burns and Mitchell,
Measuring Business Cycles, p. 403.
The indexes of business activity from which the amplitude measures are derived are
adjusted for long-term trend. For most purposes amplitude measures based on unadjusted
data would be preferable, but only one of the three indexes (AT&T) is available in
unadjusted form, and this only since 1900. The principal effect of the use of trend-adjusted
indexes is to increase the amplitude of contractions relative to that of expansions. Hence
the percentage declines in the table are roughly the same size as the percentage rises,
whereas in unadjusted data the declines would generally be smaller than the rises.
Since the percentage rise in each index is computed on the base of the average level
of the index during a specific cycle, it is smaller than if it had been computed in the usual
way with the initial (trough) figure as base. Similarly, the percentage fall is larger than
if it had been computed with the peak as base. However, as computed, the percentage
rise is comparable with the succeeding percentage fall, since both are computed on the
same base.
The amplitude measures pertain to the total rise or fall in the indexes, not to the rate
of change per month or year. For some purposes the rate may be the more significant
figure. Such rates can be approximated by dividing the total change by the duration of
the business cycle expansion or contraction, but the approximation is rough because the
total changes are based on specific cycles.
The amplitude measures depend importantly on the cycle chronology. If some of the
milder contractions had been omitted, for example, the amplitude of the expansions which
they interrupt would be much greater.
The amplitude figures shown here have serious limitations as measures of the severity
of business cycles, besides those just mentioned. The composition of each of the indexes
of business activity has changed from time to time, and these changes may have affected
their amplitude. Other measures of aggregate economic activity may be more precisely
defined conceptually and more precisely estimated statistically, especially in recent cycles.
Some such alternative measures, covering contractions since 1920, are provided in
Chapter 5, Tables 5.2 and 5.14.
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